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PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX:
CANNON V. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19721
to prevent sex discrimination in federally funded education pro-
grams.2 In ruling on Title IX,3 lower federal courts have had to de-
termine whether it affords a private cause of action for alleged
violations4 in addition to the disciplinary procedure explicitly estab-
lished under the Act.' Recently, in Cannon v. University of Chi-
1. Emergency School Aid Act, §§ 901-907, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
2. Section 901(a) provides: "No person in the United States shall on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal
funds. . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
3. For cases construing Title IX, see Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F.
Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (application for employment as security guard), disap-
proved in Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (Ist Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, Harris v. Islesboro School Comm., 444 U.S. 972 (1979) (concerning maternity
leave policy in public schools); Trent v. Perritt, 391 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Miss. 1975)
(school regulation prohibiting male students from wearing long hair styles); McCar-
thy v. Burkholder, 15 E.P.D. § 7926 (D. Kan. 1977), rmodtfed on reconsideration, 448
F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978) (maternity leave practices).
4. See Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
In ruling on Title IX, the court held that an implied right of action existed for vindi-
cating violations of statutes prohibiting sex discrimination under any federally funded
educational program. Id. at 780.
5. The former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) established
a complaint procedure involving the following:
1) The person subjected to discrimination files a complaint with HEW within 180
days of the alleged discrimination, a period which may be extended by HEW,
2) HEW is to promptly investigate, and must attempt to resolve the matter by
informal means,
3) The complainant is notified if the investigation does not warrant action,
4) If the matter proceeds to hearing the complainant shall be advised of the time
and place of the hearing, and may petition for participation in the hearing as
amicus.
45 C.F.R. §§ 80.7 to 81.23 (1979). Once a plaintiff alleges a valid claim, § 902 pro-
vides:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be ef-
fected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under
such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
cago,6 the Supreme Court confronted this issue for the first time,7
holding in favor of a private cause of action under Title IX.8
The plaintiff, Cannon, applied to the University of Chicago and
Northwestern University Medical Schools.9 After being rejected
from both, 0 she submitted a complaint to the former Department of
finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, for failure to comply with
such requirement. . . or (2) by any other means authorized by law.
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
6. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
7. Id. Plaintiffs alleging sex discrimination may also bring an action under § 1983
which gives a private cause of action to any individual who has been deprived of a
Constitutional right, privilege, or immunity by any person "under color ofany statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State." (Emphasis added.) 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976).
A plaintiff is severely limited by this provision, however, because of the difficulty
involved in proving "state action" on the part of the accused violator. The Seventh
Circuit, when discussing Cannon, held "there is no indication tlhat the state exercises
any control over the medical school admissions policies" in finding against a § 1983
violation. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1070 (7th Cir. 1978). The
court went on to say, "federal aid and assistance is insufficient for jurisdiction under
§ 1983 unless it can be shown that the state has affirmatively supported the conduct
challenged here." Id. at 1071.
This concern with affirmative support by the state and the corresponding difficulty
in proving "state action" arose in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
The Moose Lodge Court outlined a test for determination of state action; it ruled on
the basis of whether "the State 'significantly involved itself with invidious discrimina-
tions,'" citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967). 407 U.S. at 173.
The affirmative support test makes bringing § 1983 actions in cases of discrimina-
tion by educational institutions extremely difficult. The receipt of state funds will not
normally affect the private nature of the institution without some additional form of
state control. Comment, Implication of a Private Right offAction under Title IX of the
Education 4mendments o11972, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 772, 773 n.10 (1978).
8. 441 U.S. at 677.
9. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), modfied on
rehearing, 559 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1976).
10. 559 F.2d at 1067. Statistics for the 1975 entering class of the University of
Chicago (the statistics for Northwestern being very similar) indicate that admittance
was extremely competitive: 5,427 persons applied for 104 positions; 1,173 were wo-
men while 4,154 were men. Of the 104 admitted, 19 were female and 85 were male.
Over a recent four year period, 18.1% of the applicants to the University of Chicago
Medical School have been female; over the same period, 18.3% of the entering class
have been female. Id.
Both medical schools receive federal aid and both have policies against admitting
applicants who are more than 30 years old unless they have advanced degrees. Brief
for Petitioner at 3, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Petitioner
was 39 years old when she applied. Because the incidence of interrupted higher edu-
cation is higher among women than men, she claimed that the age and advanced
degree criteria operate to exclude women from consideration. Id. at 5 n. 1.
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Health, Education and Welfare (HEW),1 ' alleging discriminatory
conduct by both schools in violation of Title IX'2 When HEW
failed to effectively act on her complaint,' 3 Cannon filed suit in fed-
eral district court. 4 Neither the district court' 5 nor the Seventh Cir-
cuit' 6 found that Title IX provided a private cause of action. The
United States Supreme Court reversed,' 7 declaring that the plaintiff
had asserted a viable claim.'" Using the four-pronged test developed
in Cori v. Ash,' 9 the Cannon Court found there was an implied cause
11. Petitioner filed a complaint with the local office of HEW in April 1975, alleg-
ing, inter alia, violations of Title IX. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 3.
12. Id.
13. In June 1976, HEW informed petitioner that the local stages of its investiga-
tion were completed but that its national headquarters planned to conduct a further
"in-depth study of the issues raised" because those issues were "of first impression
and national in scope." Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at A-35, Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
14. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. IlM. 1976). Plaintiff
alleges that she was "denied admission on the basis of her age, sex, and lack of an
advanced degree." Id. at 1258. The plaintiff sought redress under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.§§ 2000c-6 and 2000c-8, as amended by Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976); the Public Health Service Act, formerly 42
U.S.C. § 295h-9, now 42 U.S.C. § 292d (1976); and the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (Supp. III 1979).
15. 406 F. Supp. at 1259. The court held that the sole disciplinary procedure
under Title IX allows HEW to enforce all claims. 406 F. Supp. at 1259. The court
stated that although the statute provides for judicial review of agency action, it does
not authorize a private right of action against a university. .d.
16. The Seventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiff improperly relied on Title VI cases
in alleging a complaint under Title IX. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d
1063, 1072 (7th Cir. 1976). See, eg., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) and Bossier
Parish School v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967) (desegregation cases involving
attempts to deprive large groups of minorities of their rights to equal education op-
portunities). The Cannon court held that Bossier and Lau did not support plaintiff's
argument for implying an individual private remedy, given the large numbers of stu-
dents involved in those cases. 559 F.2d at 1072. On rehearing, the court conceded
that private actions may not be restricted to cases involving large numbers of students,
but once more concluded plaintiff did not have a private cause of action. Id. at 1083.
The court based its modified ruling on several factors; its primary rationale was that
under the Cort x Ash analysis, implication of a private remedy would be inconsistent
with the legislative purpose and intent, given the HEW enforcement procedure that
already exists. Id. at 1081.
17. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
18. Id. at 717. The Court then remanded the case to determine whether Cannon
was discriminated against. Id.
19. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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of action under Title IX. ° In addition, the Court recognized that
Title IX paralleled Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which
prevents racial discrimination." Since the majority determined there
was an implied cause of action under Title VI,22 it analogized an im-
plied cause of action under Title IX.23
Since the early 1970's,24 the Supreme Court has grown increasingly
20. 441 U.S. at 709.
21. Id. at 693-94.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 694-96.
24. The Court's newly developed restrictive approach to implied remedies corre-
sponds to the ascent of the Burger Court. Prior to the Burger Court, the Warren
Court, from 1959-197 1, utilized the doctrine ubijus, ibi remedium-where there is a
right, there is a remedy--to create private remedies for violations of a broad spectrum
of regulatory legislation. "[Tihe Warren Court evinced an inclination to involve the
judiciary in the formulation of remedies to effectuate ... social policy." McMahon
& Rodos, Judicial Implication ofPrivate Causes of Action: Reappraisal and Retrench-
ment, 80 DICuNsoN L. Rav. 167, 175-76 (1976).
The new judicial attitude towards implication, embodied in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975); Security Investment Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); and
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974), "reflects a philosophy of judicial restraint and reluctance to broaden the juris-
diction of the federal judiciary." McMahon & Rodos, supra, at 167-68.
The conflict between the contrasting philosophies of the two courts surfaced in Biv-
ens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). This case represents the last
of the Warren Court decisions. Although Burger was Chief Justice, neither Justice
Powell nor Justice Rehnquist had been appointed by 1971. In Bivens, the plaintiff
alleged that respondent narcotic agents made a warrantless entry and search in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 389. The Supreme Court held that plaintiff
had stated a federal cause of action from which he could recover damages. Id. at 397.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion effectively illustrates the liberal attitude of the
Warren Court. He maintained that the Court may authorize relief based on viola-
tions of federal statutes in order to effectuate the underlying congressional policy. Id.
at 402. In addition, Justice Harlan's opinion demonstrates just how far the Court was
willing to go in the way of judicial lawmaking. He said that the Court may contem-
plate the same range of policy considerations in determining whether a private rem-
edy exists as Congress does when enacting the statute. Id. at 407. Justice Harlan's
statement diametrically opposed Chief Justice Burger's dissent, which foreshadowed
the restrictive approach the Burger Court later developed. The Chief Justice stated:
I dissent from today's holding which judically creates a damage remedy not
provided for by the Constitution and not enacted by Congress. We would more
surely preserve the important values of the doctrine of separation of powers-
and perhaps get a better result-by recommending a solution to the Congress as
the branch of government in which the Constitution has vested the legislative
power. Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the facilities and
competence for that task-as we do not.
Id. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). (Emphasis added.)
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conservative in finding private causes of action.2" Rather than em-
phasizing the need to provide a remedy wherever possible, the Court
25. See note 26 infra. The implication doctrine can be traced to Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall posed the question:
"If [Marbury] has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of this country
afford him a remedy?" Id. at 162. After Marbury, however, the issue of implied
remedies remained unexplored until 1916. In that year, the Supreme Court decided
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). The Rigsby case involved the Federal
Safety Appliance Act ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531, (1893) as amended by Act of March 2,
1903, ch. 976, 32 Stat. 943; Act of April 14, 1910, ch. 160, 36 Stat. 298. The Rigsby
Court had to decide whether § I of the Act, which extended protection to all employ-
ees involved with trains and other vehicles engaged in interstate commerce, allowed
recovery where the vehicle in question was not engaged in commerce at the time of
injury. The Court held that the scope of the statute was broad enough to include all
employees thus injured, regardless of the characterization as commerce. 241 U.S. at
39. The Court then introduced the following principle of implication: "A disregard
of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one
of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover
damages from the party in default is implied." Id. The Court concluded by adding
that "in every case where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a
person, he shall have a remedy. ... Id.
Several lower courts subsequently viewed the Rigsby test as the only requirement
for implying a private right of action. See, e.g., Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507,
510 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937
(1957) (criminal statute enacted for the benefit of class implies private right of action
in class member absent evidence to contrary); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (ignoring the requirements of a statute is "a wrong-
ful act and a tort" permitting a private right of action absent clear legislative intent to
the contrary).
In 1946, the Supreme Court affirmed this liberal approach in Bell v. Hood, wherein
it held: "[Wihere federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief." 327 U.S.678, 684 (1946). In 1957, the Court once more upheld the
notion that it is common "for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal
rights are concerned." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
(Emphasis added.) In 1964, the Court in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964),
had to determine whether it should allow a private cause of action under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Court
stated it would grant the necessary relief in cases involving federally secured rights.
377 US. at 433.
In the 1960's, as a corollary to the idea of "fashioning federal law" to protect fed-
eral rights, the Supreme Court started examining the sufficiency of the enforcement
procedure contained within the statute. If the procedure did not guarantee adequate
protection for an injured party, the Court would rule in favor of a private cause of
action. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,555 (1969) (Court concluded
that if each citizen were required to rely solely on the Attorney General to enforce the
Voting Rights Act, the goal of the Act--to prevent discriminatory practices in voter
eligibility procedures-would not be achieved).
1980]
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has begun to focus more on legislative intent.26 In 1974, the Court in
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. NationalAssociation of Railroad
Passengers27 held that an express statutory provision for one form of
enforcement proceeding ordinarily implies that Congress did not in-
tend another means of disciplinary action.2" It was against this re-
strictive backdrop that the Court articulated the following four-
pronged test, in Cort v. Ash,29 for deciding whether to imply a private
remedy from a given statute.3 0
First, the reviewing court must determine whether the plaintiff is a
member of the class for whose special benefit Congress created the
26. In 1974, the Supreme Court consciously applied legislative intent to deny a
private cause of action in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). The plaintiff Association, which represented railroad
passengers, challenged the discontinuance by the Central of Georgia Railway Com-
pany of several passenger trains, claiming the reduction of passenger service violated
the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-547 (1976 & Supp. 1111979)
(Amtrak Act). The district court dismissed the action, finding that plaintiff lacked
standing to sue since § 307 provided enforcement by the Attorney General. See 45
U.S.C. § 547(a) (1976) (the district court opinion was not reported). The appellate
court reversed, holding the plaintiff could bring a private cause of action. Potomac
Passenger Ass'n v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a private remedy "must be consistent with the
evident legislative intent and ... effectuation of the purposes intended to be served
by the Act." 414 U.S. at 458. The significance of this decision is that by using the
intent test, the Court began its evaluation of legislative history with a presumption
against implication. See Note, Implied Private Actions under Federal Statutes-The
Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18 W. & M. L. REv., 429, 438 (1976).
In Security Investor Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975), the Supreme Court
continued this restrictive approach. In ruling on whether the Security Investor Pro-
tection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976 & Supp. Il1 1979), created a pri-
vate cause of action, the Court affirmed its holding in National .R. Passenger Corp.
421 U.S. at 418. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), followed with the development of an
elaborate test for determining whether to imply a remedy. See note 31 infra. It is
clear from these decisions the Burger Court intended to evaluate carefully whether a
private right of action exists before granting a remedy, thereby respecting its role as
an interpreter and not a creator of laws. See McMahon & Rodos, supra note 24, at
184.
27. 414 U.S. 453 (1974), rehearing denied, 415 U.S. 952 (1974). See note 26 upra.
28. Id. at 458. See note 26 supra.
29. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
30. Id. There is confusion over how many of the Cort factors have to be satisfied
before the Court will imply a remedy. It is possible that if one factor is missing, a
court will not find a remedy. Petersen, Implied Remedies under Federal Statutes: A
New Look, 80 COM. L.J. 480, 483 (1975). The degree of the test's restrictiveness will
not be ascertained until it is determined how many criteria must be satisfied.
[Vol. 20:273
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statute.3 ' Next, the court must decide whether there is any indication
of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create or deny such a rem-
edy. 32 Third, the court has to evaluate the underlying legislative pur-
pose and assess whether implying a remedy is consistent with it.33
Finally, the court must consider whether the cause of action is tradi-
tionally a state concern, 34 making a federal remedy inappropriate. 35
Employing the Cori analysis in an extremely restrictive fashion, the
Supreme Court has generally refused to grant private causes of action
under federal statutes.36 Lower courts have similarly used the Cort
31. 422 U.S. at 78. The Cort case involved a stockholder derivative suit against a
corporation alleging violations of a federal act which prohibited corporations from
making contributions or expenditures in connection with specified federal elections.
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976). The first factor stems from the Court's hold-
ing in Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). See note 25 supra. In
Cor, the Court decided that the primary concern of the statute was to ensure against
the control of federal elections by big business. 422 U.S. at 82. It stated that protec-
tion of ordinary stockholders was at best a secondary concern. Id. at 81. The Court
then concluded there was not a clearly articulated federal right in favor of the plain-
tiff. Id. at 82. The plaintiff, therefore, failed to satisfy the first prong of the analysis.
32. 422 U.S. at 82. The Court qualified its evaluation of legislative intent by stip-
ulating that where "federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not
necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit
purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling." Id. at 83. The Court
then declared it was doubtful that Congress intended to vest the plaintiff class with
rights broader than those provided by state regulation of corporations. Id. The Court
stated that only an intent to deny a remedy would be controlling. Id. This appears to
directly modify the presumption against the implication the Court elucidated in Na-
tional RR. Passenger Corp. and Barbour. If it does not change the presumption then
it at least shifts the burden from the complainant under the statute to the respondent.
33. Id. at 84. In considering legislative purpose, the Court held that allowing pri-
vate stockholder suits would not effectuate the goal of the statute, which the Court
identified as curing the influence which the use of corporate funds would have on
federal elections. Id.
34. Id. at 78. The Court ruled that corporations are creatures of state law and,
with certain exceptions, investors commit their funds with the understanding that
state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation. Id. at 84.
35. Id. at 78. In this case, since state law normally governs corporate activity, and
laws governing the corporation may put the shareholder on notice that he has no
recourse under federal statutes, the Court found that providing a federal right of ac-
tion would have been inappropriate. Id. at 85.
The Court's application of the four-pronged test indicates that private remedies will
not be lightly implied. Note, supra note 25, at 1381. See also Note, Implication of
Private Actionsfrom Federal Statutes: From Borak to Ash, 1 J. CoRP. L. 371, 371-72,
380-89 (1976).
36. Since its opinion in Cort, the Supreme Court has twice discussed the Cort
factors in denying a private remedy. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
477-79 (1977) (Court denied a private remedy to minority shareholders seeking dam-
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
test to deny federal private rights of action.37
The issue of an implied remedy has frequently arisen under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon,38
the Fifth Circuit decided in favor of an implied cause of action under
Title V19 of the Act. The court held that individuals may bring
claims under Title VI when there is no other procedure through
which they may protect their rights.4 ° Several courts have cited Boss-
ier in ruling on a private cause of action under Title VI.4  These
cases do not, however, provide strong precedent for an individual as-
serting a private claim under Title VI. They usually involved class
action suits42 and, frequently, these courts have based their decisions
ages or injunctive relief in federal court for respondent's merger, holding this was a
cause of action "traditionally relegated to the states"); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37-41 (1977), rehearing denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977) (Court denied
private remedy to plaintiff, an unsuccessful bidder for control of a corporation, hold-
ing that all four Cort factors weighed against a private cause of action). For an analy-
sis of the implied remedies doctrine and its relation to the Chris-Craft case, see Pitt,
Standing to Sue under the Williams Act after Chris-Craft: A Leaky Shio on Troubled
Waters, 34 Bus. LAw. 117, 120, 162 (1978).
37. See Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1975) (court
applied the Cort test to deny a private action under the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976)); People's House Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie,
425 F. Supo. 482, 490-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (denying private right under Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5319 (1976 & Supp. III
1979)); Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732, 738
(E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977) (private right
under Title IX denied).
38. 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
39. Id. at 852.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Boykins v. Fairfield, Alabama Bd. of Educ., 399 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.
1968) (class action suit involving desegregation of public school system); Soria v. Ox-
nard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 386 F. Supp. 579 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (class action suit
brought to enjoin discriminatory practices in Oxnard School District); Blackshear
Residents Org. v. Housing Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (class action
suit brought by black and Mexican-Americans to halt further construction of alleged
racially segregational public housing project).
42. See note 41 supra. But see Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 524 F.2d 1013, 1014
(8th Cir. 1975), where an individual plaintiff brought suit under Title VI, alleging
racial discrimination by a community athletic organization. The court ruled there
was no discrimination, thus never considering whether Title VI afforded a private
remedy. Id. at 1015.
The importance of the distinction between individual and class action suits lies in
both the numbers involved and the threat of increased litigation. See, e.g., Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 1976). It would seem that where
a large group of individuals are involved, the deprivation of rights would more read-
[Vol. 20:273
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on alternate grounds.43
In Lau v. Nichols," the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a plaintiff
bringing a private claim under Title VI without addressing the ques-
tion of whether an implied remedy exists, since the parties failed to
raise the issue on appeal.45 Because the Supreme Court did not con-
front the question of an implied remedy directly, lower courts have
not universally regarded the Lau holding as providing a private rem-
edy under Title VI.4
6
ily justify an implied remedy. In addition, the subject of most Title VI suits is the
discriminatory practices of relatively large organizations. Class action suits not only
insure the rights of many, they generally involve less time, money, and effort when
compared to individual suits. Frequently, one class action will necessarily foreclose
potential litigants. Finally, in some instances, Title VI litigation will result in the
interruption of federal assistance. It is unlikely that courts would be willing to rule in
favor of an injunction resulting in loss of funds in an individual action.
43. See, e.g., Kelly v. Altheimer, Arkansas Pub. School Dist. No. 22, 378 F.2d
483, 485 (8th Cir. 1967) (although plaintiff cited Title VI violations, suit was initiated
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation Ass'n, 341 F.
Supp. 1382. 1382 (E.D. Va. 1972) (the basis for the cause of action was never men-
tioned); Blackshear Residents Org. v. Housing Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1139 (W.D.
Tex. 1972) (Court held plaintiffs had standing to sue under Title VI, but never ad-
dressed the issue of whether a private cause of action existed); Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (plaintiffs had standing to sue
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore the court never decided whether Title VI al-
lowed an independent private cause of action). But see Cypress v. Newport News
General and Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 660 (4th Cir. 1967) (Court
awarded a private remedy under Title VI, holding, "It would be fatuous to abstain
where the right to relief has been abundantly proved."
44. 414 U.S. 563 (1970).
45. 1d.
46. The issue plaintiffs raised in Lau was whether a large number of Chinese
students could bring a class action suit to compel the availability of bilingual educa-
tion programs. Id. at 564. The Court wondered whether the alleged violation came
under Title VI, the Equal Protection Clause, or both. It did not reach the equal pro-
tection argument, however, as it relied solely on Title VI. Id. at 566. This ruling,
coupled with the fact that the issue of an implied remedy was raised in the lower
courts, led the Supreme Court in Cannon to cite Lau as upholding a private cause of
action under Title VI. 441 U.S. at 702 n.33. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
The problem with this assertion rests with the Court's opinion in Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Powell, when confronted with the issue
of an implied right under Title VI, declined to rule, averring, "We assume only for
purposes of this case that there exists a private cause of action under Title VI." Id. at
284. If the question had been resolved in Lau, then why does he assume "only for
purposes of this case" that there exists an implied remedy? This hesitation raises
serious doubt, expecially since Justice White, in his dissent in Bakke, insisted emphat-
ically that Title VI does not convey a private cause of action. Id. at 381 (White, J.,
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The Supreme Court in Cannon applied the Cort analysis47 to find
an implied remedy under Title IX.48 As support for its analysis, the
Court concluded tjiere was available an implied cause of action
under Title VI.4 9 The Court began by identifying the plaintiff as a
member of the special class for whom the statute was enacted.50 It
dissenting). Justice White stated, "A private cause of action ... would not be 'con-
sistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.'" id. at 380-81 (White,
J. dissenting), quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
The Court's failure to take an affirmative stance in Lau led to subsequent Title VI
decisions which were dependent upon Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Lau.
Justice Blackmun qualified the Court's holding in favor of a Title VI violation by
asserting:
[I] stress the fact that the children with whom we are concerned here number
about 1,800. This is a very substantial group. [If] we [were] concerned with just
a single child ... I would not regard today's decision as conclusive .... For
me, numbers are at the heart of this case and my concurrence is to be understood
accordingly.
414 U.S. at 571-72 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
This "numbers theory" has been adopted by several jurisdictions as their under-
standing of Lau. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974)
(citing Blackmun, J.). The Serna court held, "only when a substantial group is being
deprived of a meaningful education will a Title VI violation exist." Id at 1154. Ac-
cord, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), modied on
rehearing, 559 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1976); Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist.
No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 568 F.2d 1312
(10th Cir. 1977).
An alternative explanation of Justice Blackmun's opinion might be that he was
concerned with the unavailability of this type of remedy to a smaller class of plain-
tiffs, and that his reasoning thus had nothing to do with an implied remedy under
Title VI. Comment, supra note 7, at 776 n.35.
The Seventh Circuit in Cannon conceded on rehearing that it might have misinter-
preted Justice Blackmun's opinion. 559 F.2d at 1083. But the court went on to say
that even assuming a misinterpretation of his opinion, "the right of action in Lau was
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the issue of whether an implied cause of action
lay directly under the provisions of Title VI was never presented to the Supreme
Court." Id.
47. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra.
48. 441 U.S. at 709.
49. In ruling that Title VI afforded a private remedy, the Cannon Court relied
heavily on Bossier and the cases following it. 441 U.S. at 696-97. See note 41 supra.
In addition, the Court cited Lau v. Nichols as a case where it had ruled in favor of an
implied remedy under Title VI. 441 U.S. at 702 n.33. See note 46 supra.
50. 441 U.S. at 694. The Court concluded that to resolve this question, one must
look to the statutory language. If the language expressly identifies the class Congress
intended to benefit, a court can imply a cause of action for a member of that class. Id.
at 690. In Cannon, the Court held that the Title IX language, "no person shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in . . . " focuses on the concept of a
benefited class, of which the plaintiff is a member. Id. at 694. The Court went on to
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then decided that Congress intended to create a private action under
Title IX,5' looking to the legislative history behind Title VI z The
Court ruled that Congress has assumed there would be private ac-
tions brought under Title VI5 and further, that Congress equated
distinguish the above language from a general ban on discriminatory conduct. Id. at
694-95.
51. Id. at 703.
52. It is unclear why the Cannon Court did not approach the legislative intent
from the standpoint of determining whether Congress intended to deny a private rem-
edy under Title VI, since Cori v. Ash established that finding an intent to deny a
remedy would be controlling. 422 U.S. at 82. Moreover, approaching the legislative
history from that angle would alleviate the burden of proof in favor of implication.
Instead, in attempting to prove that Congress intended to create an implied remedy
under Title VI, the Cannon Court glossed over or misinterpreted several remarks that
evidence a contrary intention.
Although the purpose behind Title VI is to end discrimination, it is not clear
whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action. During a debate be-
tween Senator Case and Senator Humphrey over the broad powers § 602 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976) confers to HEW, the following discus-
sion ensued:
Mr. Humphrey: 602 and 603 do not in any way limit the substantive law of
section 601 but set forth a procedure for the enforcement of the law for these
activities included in Title VI; and I think the purpose is to see to it that there is
not what I term "capricious action" and also that there shall be judicial review,
and that any order to be promulgated "shall"-not "may"-have the approval of
the President. This limitation is on the enforcement of the policy of section 601,
not in the substantive law enunciated in section 601.
Mr. Case: Yes; but we do not permit existing-
Mr. Humphrey: No new rights are granted here nor any taken away; but here we
have prescribed means of enforcing these rights.
Mr. Case: I appreciate the Senator's statement.
110 CONG. REC. 5254-55 (1964) (Remarks of Senators Case and Humphrey). The
majority in Cannon felt that Senator Humphrey's comments indicated that § 602 did
not limit a private right of action under § 601. 441 U.S. at 712.
Another area of confusion lies in the Court's treatment of the Keating proposal. In
1963, Sen. Keating, along with Sen. Ribicoff, introduced an amendment to Title VI.
The proposal would have allowed the Attorney General, and anyone aggrieved by
acts depriving or potentially depriving him or her of Title VI rights, to bring a private
action. District courts would have had jurisdiction of actions under the section "with-
out regard to whether the party aggrieved shall have exhausted an administrative or
other remedy." See 109 CoNrG. REc. 15375 (1963).
The Court explained the rejection of this proposal and the resulting compromise
(Title VI basically as it was enacted) in the following manner: The final bill was
directed against discriminatory practices rather than cutting off funds. -The emphasis
on preventing discrimination insulated the government from litigation. 441 U.S. at
715.
53. 441 U.S. at 699. The Cannon Court held with reference to the attorney's fee
provision in the Education Amendments of 1972 that the language presumes the
availability of private actions to enforce Title VI in the context of education. Id.
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Title VI with Title IX. 5 4 The Court then reasoned that recognizing a
private remedy under Title IX was consistent with the underlying
purpose of ending sex discrimination.55 Finally, the Court briefly
mentioned that discrimination was a matter of federal concern not
traditionally relegated to the states. 6 Thus, the facts satisfied all four
factors of the Cort analysis.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Cannon is not wholly convinc-
ing. It assumes that prior cases created individual private causes of
action under Title VI. 7 With the exception of Bossier,58 however,
there is no clear justification for that assumption. 9 Moreover, in
holding that a private cause of action already exists under Title VI,60
the Court ignored its former inclination against ruling on that issue.6'
In addition, although the legislative history indicates that Congress
did not resolve whether Title VI contains a private remedy,62 the
Court found that Congress clearly intended an individual cause of
action under that statute.63 The analysis in Cannon is difficult to rec-
oncile with the Burger Court's previous reluctance to infer congres-
sional intent to create private remedies under federal statutes. 64
Subsequent Supreme Court rulings on private causes of action af-
firm that Cannon may be an anomalous decision.65 In Touche Ross v.
54. Id. at 703. There is strong evidence supporting this contention. During the
congressional debate over Title IX, various Senators introduced statements equating
the two provisions. See 118 CoNG. REc. 5807 (1972).
55. 441 U.S. at 704. The Court identified the salient legislative objectives as (1)
avoiding the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices and (2) pro-
viding individual citizens with effective protection against those practices. Id.
56. Id. at 708. The Court noted that citizens have relied on the federal govern-
ment and the federal courts for decades to protect them against such discrimination.
Id.
57. The Court's reliance on Bossier and the cases accompanying it suggests a less
than searching analysis of what those cases say. The Cannon Court gave little weight
to the facts that these cases were often decided on alternative grounds, and that they
dealt with a large group of plaintiffs as opposed to a single individual. Other courts
have given more weight to these distinctions. See note 46 supra.
58. 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967).
59. See notes 41 & 43 supra.
60. 441 U.S. at 696-703.
61. See note 46 supra.
62. See note 52 supra.
63. 441 U.S. at 703.
64. See note 24 supra.
65. See note 70 and accompanying text infra.
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Reddington ,66 the Supreme Court ruled against a private cause of ac-
tion which plaintiff brought under the Securities Exchange Act.67 It
pointedly cautioned against finding congressional intent to provide
an individual cause of action where the legislative history is silent or
ambiguous.6" The Touche Court further opined that private causes
of action are within the province of the legislature, not the courts. 69
Thus, in Touche, the Supreme Court reestablished its restrictive ap-
proach to implication.7"
The Cannon holding is nevertheless understandable, considering
the nature of the statute involved. There are strong policy considera-
tions favoring a private remedy under Titles VI and IX.7 Both Con-
gress and the courts have recognized that ending discrimination is a
desirable objective.72 Individual causes of action are necessary to ef-
66. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
67. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
68. 442 U.S. at 571. The Touche Court stated that implying a private right of
action where the legislative history is silent was out of the question. Id.
69. Id. at 578. The Court observed that the ultimate question is one of congres-
sional intent, not one of whether the Court thinks it can improve upon the statutory
scheme that Congress enacted into law. Id.
70. The Court referred to J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1963), which also
involved a private right of action under the Securities Exchange Act during a more
liberal period of implication, see notes 24-25 supra, and made the following observa-
tion: "It suffices to say that in a series of cases since Borak, we have adhered to a
stricter standard for the implication of private causes of action, and we follow that
stricter standard today." 442 U.S. at 433.
Since Touche, the Supreme Court has ruled on several cases concerning private
rights of action. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979). In this case, the Court asserted that there was but alimited private
remedy to void an investment advisers contract. It once more eschewed its emphasis
on providing remedies to effectuate congressional purposes, contending the sole in-
quiry is whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action. Id. at 245
(Emphasis added.)
71. Congress designed Title VI to.end racial discrimination and to insure that
federal expenditures are in accord with the Constitution. 110 CONG. REc. 6544
(1964) (Remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
72. In addition to the Title VI history already cited, Congress has consistently
evidenced its desire to end discriminatory practices. In the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
Congress forbade all state voting regulations which have the effect of denying citizens
their right to vote because of race. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). In Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1968), the Supreme
Court upheld a private right of action as a necessary adjunct to the enforcement pro-
cedure already in the Act. Id. at 557.
Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Congress prohibited discrimination against
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fectuate this goal73 as they act as a deterrent.74 Potential violators
will not discriminate as readily if private individuals can threaten
them with litigation.75 In addition, federal agencies have been partic-
ularly ineffective in their enforcement of Title IX.76 A private cause
of action is therefore essential to achieve the statute's objective of
preventing discrimination in education programs.
The Cannon decision has already had a pronounced effect on lower
court decisions concerning Titles VI and IX.7 7 In N44CP v. Medical
Center, Inc. ,78 the Third Circuit found that a private cause of action
exists under Title VI,7 9 citing Cannon as a major factor in its deci-
sion.80 Other courts have utilized Cannon in a similar manner. 8'
otherwise qualified handicapped individuals in programs requiring federal financial
assistance. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). In Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977), the court held that the Act allowed a
private cause of action in furtherance of the private rights underlying the Act. Id. at
1285. The Lloyd case represents one of the few post-Cort decisions finding an im-
plied right of action. See note 37 supra.
73. See Note, The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 34 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 205, 215 (1977); Note, Awarding Attorneys'Fees to the "Private Attorney
General:" Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HAST.
L.J. 733 (1973).
74. A district court recognized deterrence of wrongdoers as a valid ground for
implication in Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 360 (S.D. Cal.
1961).
75. The threat of private lawsuits against noncomplying school districts or states
would be an added incentive to compliance with Title IX. Shelton & Berndt, Sex
Discrimination in Vocational Education: Title IX and Other Remedies, 62 CAL. L.
REV. 1121, 1158 n.220 (1974).
Granting private rights of action under Title IX may also have negative ramifica-
tions. Although the existence of private action will deter potential violators, it will
also subject professional schools to litigation by disappointed applicants who see a
new avenue of opportunity for admission, thus interfering in many cases with a well
thought out admissions policy. UNITED STATES COMM. ON Civ. RIGHTS, AoE Dis-
CRIMINATION STUDY 107 (1977).
76. HEW required 20,318 schooli districts and colleges to file acceptance compli-
ance statements by September 30, 1976. School Law News at 3 (March 18, 1977). By
March 15, 1977, only 6,742 had done so. Id. See also Shelton & Berndt, supra note
75, at 1138-49, 1158 (extensive interviews and correspondence with HEW indicate
difficulties of enforcement); Comment, Sex Discrimination in Athletics: Conflicting
Legislative and Judicial 4pproaches, 29 ALA. L. REv. 390, 418 (1978) (due to large
number of complaints, enforcement may be impossible without private remedy).
77. See notes 78-81 infra.
78. 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979).
79. Id. at 1258, finding the cause also under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See note 72 supra.
80. 599 F.2d at 1256-57.
81. In Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (D. Conn.
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Thus, in ruling in favor of a private cause of action, the Cannon court
has set a precedent that will insure greater protection against contin-
ued discrimination.
Henry B. Merens
1979), the court ruled in favor of a private cause of action under Title VI, noting the
Supreme Court's ruling in Cannon. See also Clark v. Louisa County School Bd., 472
F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1979). Although the court ruled there was no private cause of
action under Title VI, it acknowledged that the Cannon decision would have made a
difference if the court had been able to peruse it prior to the trial, and if the plaintiffs
pleadings had not been defective. Id. at 323, 324 n. I.
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